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Abstract—
The Tor anonymous network has become quite popular
with regular users on the Internet. In the Tor network, an
anonymous path is created by selecting three relays through
which the connection is redirected. Nevertheless, as the
number of Tor users has increased substantially in recent
years, the algorithm with which the relays are selected af-
fects the performance provided by the Tor network. More
importantly as the performance suffers, users will leave the
network, resulting in a lower anonymity set and in turn
lower security provided by Tor network.
In this paper, we proposed an algorithm for improving
performance and security of the Tor network, by employing
a combination of different metrics in the process of the path
selection between the source and destination node. These
metrics are bandwidth and uptime of relays as node con-
ditions and delays between the relays as a path condition.
Through a number of experiments we show that we could
double the performance observed by end users when using
the proposed technique as opposed to the current Tor path
selection algorithm. More importantly, the proposed tech-
nique only requires a software upgrade on the client side,
and other Tor nodes do not need to be modified.
Index Terms—Anonymous Networks, Tor Network, Path
Selection, Composite-Metric, Geographical location, La-
tency
I. Introduction
TOR [1] is the most well-known anonymous networkwhich has a large user-base around the globe. As
a general rule, when the number of participants increases
in an anonymous network, the overall anonymity provided
by the network also increases. The rapid growth of the Tor
network has not been anticipated in its design, which has
led to many latency issues. For example in a world scale
network, the Tor protocol may at times circulate packets
several times around the world before delivering them to
the receiver; or the increase in the number of nodes con-
necting and directing traffic through the Tor, has resulted
in Tor relays being overloaded. This effect has not been
small. McCoy et al. [2] note a five-fold increase in latency
experienced by clients as compared to when their connec-
tion does not go through the Tor network. This increase
in latency leads to user dissatisfaction and a reduction in
the number of active users; resulting in a decrease in the
anonymity provided by the network.
Anonymity is provided in the Tor network, by redirect-
ing the connection through multiple Tor relays (usually
three relay nodes are used), before the connection is made
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to the final destination. A list of available nodes, will-
ing to operate as relays, with their bandwidth and uptime
statistics is published by Tor directory servers. Based on
the published information, a Tor client selects the nodes
through which the Tor path is created.
The proper selection of these relays, directly affects
the performance observed by the communicating parties.
Where in general, the overall delay experienced by the
client would consist of transmission delay (i.e. link band-
width), queuing delay (i.e. due to network congestion), and
propagation delay (i.e. physical distance between nodes).
For example if low bandwidth relays are selected, the client
will experience a low bandwidth connection, and is more
likely to leave the network.
Nevertheless, always selecting relays with higher band-
width and larger uptime values creates other problems. In
fact, there is an important trade off when selecting the
Tor relays. On one side, and from the performance as-
pect, a high bandwidth node with a large uptime value
(i.e. reliability of the node) would be preferential. But,
from a security perspective, if nodes are chosen in a deter-
ministic manner (i.e. always best available node) then an
attacker could, with high probability, guess which nodes
will be selected by a client and in turn mount an attack
on the anonymous network. Hence, there should be some
randomness in selecting the nodes.
Other than bandwidth and uptime, a third parameter
which effects the performance obtained by a client is path
latency. There have been a number of proposals in [3],
[4], [5], which measure the path delay, and consider it as
a factor when selecting the Tor relays in the process of
creating a connection through the network. An alternate
approach is proposed by Akhoondi et al [6], where they
argue that the geographical location of nodes could be used
as a good measurement base to calculate the path latency
between them; where this information could be obtained
by using available IP to geographical location mappings.
In this work, we proposed a new path selection method-
ology which takes into account the delay between relays,
in addition to the bandwidth and uptime of the relays ,
when selecting them to create an anonymous path. Our ap-
proach differs from previous works as it exploits composite-
metrics for path selection, considers usage history of users
and so incurs low overhead on the resources and minimum
run-time to provide a suitable path. More specifically our
contributions are:
• Proposing a path selection algorithm which efficiently
selects a set of relays for an anonymous connection
while considering bandwidth, reliability, and delay be-
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tween the selected relays for improved end-to-end per-
formance.
• Evaluating the proposed technique through a number
of experiments, in which it is shown that the proposed
technique could double the performance observed by
the client as compared to the default path selection
technique used in the Tor network.
• By creating paths to the average geo-location point
visited by the client, the proposed algorithm avoids
creating a new path for each new destination and
hence more stable paths are created and the client
does not get delayed for each new destination he/she
intends to visit.
• The proposed algorithm requires no change to the cur-
rent Tor network and changes are only required on the
clients which are interested in obtaining improved per-
formance.
In the rest of this manuscript, we discuss related works
in Section II. In Section III, we introduce our proposed al-
gorithm for path selection in the Tor network and in Sec-
tion IV we evaluate the proposed method and compare
the results with different path selection algorithms. We
discuss the obtained results and how it compares with re-
lated work in this area in Section V. Finally, we conclude
in Section VI.
II. related works
There have been a number of previous studies on im-
proving path selection in the Tor anonymous network. A
number of studies [7], [8] select the best path with respect
to the Autonomous Systems traversed. A path selection
method in which overloaded nodes are avoided is proposed
[9]. Sherr et al [10] introduce a flexible path selection de-
sign in which applications select a trade-off between per-
formance and anonymity based on the user’s specific re-
quirements. Furthermore the notion of trust is employed
in [11], [12], [13], [14] in order to increase security. In
addition [15] propose a method for improving performance
of Tor by changing its transport layer design. There are
also a number of proposals [3], [4], [5], [6] with the goal of
optimizing the path while considering the latency between
relays.
Wacek et al. [16] compare and contrast a number of path
selection algorithms through a number of experiments.
They observe that ignoring the relay bandwidths when
selecting a path, results in an overall poor performance.
Furthermore, considering distance between relays would
improve the end-to-end delays. In the rest of this section
we will focus on techniques which consider the latency be-
tween relays and consider the rest of the approaches as out
of scope.
Sherr et al. [3] propose a method in which every node
in the network is disclosed as a point in an n-dimensional
coordinate system. RTT between two nodes is attributed
to distance of related two points in the coordinate system.
Each node calculates its exact place in the system using
the ping protocol and through a united coordinate system
downloaded through the directory server could estimate
the RTT between available nodes. Nevertheless, the pro-
posed method requires a software update to all Tor clients
and relays, which is not very practical. Moreover, there is
no mechanism considered for prohibiting relays from an-
nouncing wrong information about their place which could
lead to an incorrect coordinate system.
In order to mitigate the above noted problems,
Panchenko et al. [4] propose that each client which wants
to calculate RTT between relays, should first create a path
using those relays and then force the last relay to send a
packet to the sender with which the RTT could be mea-
sured. Where this could be achieved by transmitting a
packet which violates the exit policy of last relay, in turn
compelling it to transmit a feedback packet to the initial
sender. Nevertheless, such approach would create a lot
of excessive traffic and is time consuming for measuring
RTTs.
An alternate approach is proposed in [5], in which gen-
eration of excessive traffic is avoided. More specifically,
in Tor special control packets are generated intermittently
(i.e. when a new TCP exit stream is established, after
a certain number of data cells are transmitted, or etc.).
Hence by observing these packets, the sender could esti-
mate the RTT of the path. Although this method has no
extra load on the network traffic, it requires a long ex-
ecution time before it could provide a good view of the
latencies in the network.
Akhoondi et al. [6] propose a practical, low overhead,
and reliable method for calculating RTT between Tor re-
lays. They argue that geographical distance between nodes
is a good indicator for latency between the nodes. There-
fore, they argue that the distances between geographical
location of nodes on a 2-dimensional map is a good es-
timate for RTT between them. In order to avoid high
computation cost, by considering all possible nodes for cal-
culating path latencies, the nodes geographically close to
each other are grouped into a set of clusters, and then a
random node is chosen from each selected cluster, where
clusters are selected so that the end-to-end geographical
distance is minimized. Although such approach decreases
the run-time of the algorithm, but it also reduces the preci-
sion in selecting shorter paths. Furthermore, by clustering
many geographically close nodes, one is unable to select
the better node in the cluster based on other factors such
as the node’s bandwidth or uptime.
Another problem is that their method is dependent to
the location of specific destination in which a user wants to
make a connection with. So path selection should be done
after the destination server has been determined, which
leads to putting users on hold while the circuit to that
destination is established.
Altogether by only reducing propagation delay, one can-
not make a comprehensive path selection method. Because
a large share of delay is related to bandwidth and reliabil-
ity of relays participating in a circuit. So a comprehensive
path selection algorithm should consider different aspects
of network delay (i.e. propagation delay, queuing delay,
and transmission delay). In what follows we will propose a
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new approach in which all these parameters are considered.
III. proposed algorithm
As only a small percentage of Tor relays have very high
bandwidths, path selection approaches which only consider
relay bandwidths would tend to select such nodes, creat-
ing more deterministic paths and also congesting these few
nodes by placing heavy loads on them. On the other hand,
only selecting relays based on their geographical location,
will put heavier load on some relays near specific high traf-
fic locations. Hence, it would be beneficial to select paths
while considering three parameters, up-time for reliability,
bandwidth for performance, and geographical locations for
latency.
An important observation is that users generally visit
some specific websites on a daily basis, checking email, us-
ing some particular social network, or visiting news web-
sites. This deterministic pattern enables one to select the
Tor path which ends closest to the areas regularly visited
by the client. Hence, by storing geographical location data
of the servers visited by the user and the frequency of the
visits, one could obtain an average geo-location point by
averaging the vertical and horizontal positions of the vis-
ited servers.
For instance if someone accesses a web server in China
two times and a web server in England three times, then
the average-geo-location point will be on the length of
2
5
on the link connecting China to England. Based on this
simple heuristic our path selection method will be indepen-
dent of the destination address. This independence brings
important benefits to the proposed approach such as more
stable and permanent circuits, lower traffic overhead, and
lower setup time. These benefits will be discussed in detail
in Section V.
In the proposed path selection technique relays in a path
are chosen incrementally and one after the other. For ex-
ample, in a circuit consisting of three relays, first we choose
the last relay, then the second one, and then the first re-
lay in the path. In each phase we consider all the relays
available in the Tor directory server and each one gets a
rank based on its bandwidth, uptime, and location. This
method is independent to the destination address which
user intends to make a connection with, instead we con-
sider an average-geo-location point as noted above.
We use different functions for calculating latency of
nodes in each step of our method. The third relay’s latency
is measured given the average-geo-location of the servers
visited by the client. Afterwards, the second relay’s la-
tency is measured based on the third relay’s location, and
the first relay’s latency in the path is measured based on
the second relay’s location. In what follows we first present
the methodology in which the distance between the client
and avg. geo-location is measured and then later in the sec-
tion we discuss how relays are ranked and selected based
on the discussed parameters (i.e. delay, bandwidth, and
reliability).
Algorithm 1 Latency Measuring pseudo-code
procedure selectPath(S,H,D)
inputs = source s,History H,Directory D
list circuit
node R1,R2,R3
(x,y,sum,Avg)← 0 . selecting R3:
if H is Empty then
x←Random[0,1)
R3←D.element(x ∗D.size)
else
for all nodes n ∈H do
Avgx←Avgx +n.x ∗n.count
Avgy←Avgy +n.y ∗n.count
sum← sum+n.count
end for
Avgx←Avgx/sum
Avgy←Avgy/sum
for all nodes n ∈D do
n.RD← dist(s,n) + dist(Avg,n)
end for
end if
select R3 after computing rank of all nodes
for all nodes n ∈D do . selecting R2:
n.RD← dist(s,n) + dist(R3,n)
end for
select R2 after computing rank of all nodes
for all nodes n ∈D do . selecting R1:
n.RD← dist(s,n) + dist(R2,n)
end for
select R1 after computing rank of all nodes
end procedure
A. Relative Distance
We defined a Relative Distance measure, in short RD,
with the goal of minimizing the end-to-end delay in the
selected paths. As noted in [6], 2D geographical distance
of two nodes on a map can be used as an estimate for
the RTT between them. Although packets do not always
traverse in direct paths and the traversed path depends on
the underlying network topology, nevertheless minimizing
the distance between relays results in a decreased delay.
Hence we calculate the distance between two nodes, a and
b, in a 2D space by considering their x-y coordinates and
using the noted relationship:
dist(a,b) =
√
(xa−xb)2 + (ya− yb)2
Afterwards, we define RD as a measure in relation to the
source node’s geographical location. More specifically, we
defined the RD of node A as equal to the distance of the
source node to the destination node when the path goes
through node A. For example, the RD value for the third
relay (i.e. R3, the last relay used in the path) is calculated
by:
RDR3(n) = dist(n,source node) + dist(n,Avg Geo)
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We then calculate the RD for the second relays, R2, as
from the source to the third relay, R3:
RDR2(n) = dist(n,source node) + dist(n,relay3)
Similarly, the RD for the first relay, R1, is calculated
by:
RDR1(n) = dist(n,source node) + dist(n,relay2)
The pseudo-code of the algorithm for measuring latency
for each relay node is available in 1.
B. Relay Ranking and Selection
As noted earlier, the proposed technique considers three
metrics of geographical location, bandwidth, and reliabil-
ity, when selecting the relays. Therefore, we need to assign
a ranking score to each relay in order to select the proper
relay at each step. After comparing many different combi-
nations we believe the following relationship gives proper
weight to each of the three considered parameters:
Rankn = perfn ∗ (1− latencyn) ∗ log2 (1 + reliabilityn)
Where, Rankn designates the rank assigned to node n, in
which:
perfn =
bandwidthn
max bandwidth
latencyn =
RDn
max RD
reliabilityn =
uptimen
max uptime
For each node performancen is its bandwidth divided by
maximum bandwidth in the network and latencyn as the
RD of that node to the maximum available RD. Also we
construct Reliabilityn as the uptime of the node in seconds
divided by maximum available uptime in the network. Fur-
thermore and in order to make a clear distinction between
low uptime values and higher uptime values, we weight the
uptime value by a logarithm function in the ranking equa-
tion noted above. This could be explained by the fact that
high uptime relays are almost as reliable as each other but
low uptime relays should be differentiated strictly.
After ranking the relays each relay with higher rank
value has a greater chance for being selected. Therefore
each node which has lower latency (distance to a pre-
ferred location), higher bandwidth, and higher uptime has
a greater rank. But, and as noted earlier, it is not possible
to always select the highest ranking relay as the created
path should be somewhat unpredictable, otherwise an at-
tack could be mounted against the anonymity network.
To that end, we employ an approach noted in [4] with
which some randomness is introduced when selecting relays
in order to prevent an attacker from anticipating the path
that will be used. More specifically, a random number is
selected from zero to sum of all the ranks. Then starting
from the highest ranked relay, relay rankings are added
together until this amount gets bigger than the random
value, at which time the last counted relay will be selected.
Hence each relay has some probability according to its rank
for being selected. The pseudo-code of the algorithm is
presented as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 relay selection pseudo-code
procedure selectbyRank(D)
inputs = Directory D
node R
sum← 0
for all nodes n ∈D do
sum← sum+n.rank
end for
x←Random[0,1) ∗ sum
for nodes i← 0 to D.length do
if x <D.element(i).rank then
R←D.element(i)
return R
else
x← x−D.element(i).rank
end if
end for
end procedure
In the next section, we evaluate the proposed Tor path
selection technique.
IV. Evaluation
There have been many different methodologies em-
ployed in the literature to evaluate proposals on the Tor
anonymity network. A number of proposals (e.g. [17], [2],
[18]), have used the real-world Tor network for experimen-
tation. Although, Soghoian [19] notes that carrying out
experiments on the real Tor network has created problem-
atic behaviors, for example affecting the overall quality of
network or threatening the privacy of users. Moreover, in
such experiment, the researchers are unable to modify the
network and observe the effect on the Tor network and
the anonymity it provides. On the other hand, a num-
ber of works (e.g. [20], [21], [22] have employed experimen-
Tor [23], with which one is able to emulate the Tor network
while considering different network configurations.
As such, in this manuscript we employ the experimen-
Tor [23] software as well, which is a large scale emulator
that models a network topology using modelnet [24]. More
specifically, we have used experimenTor on two separate
machines that are connected with a gigabit Ethernet link.
All of the Tor relays, directory servers, user nodes, and
web pages run on the host machine which is a server with
12 core-2.4 GHz CPU and 18 Gigabytes of RAM, running
Generic Ubuntu 3.2.0-27. The other machine is the emu-
lator which runs a FreeBSD 6.3 OS, on a 2 core-2.0 GHz
CPU with 2GB of RAM. Emulator has the role of the core
of the network and all traffic between nodes passes through
the emulator.
For modeling a topology like Internet topology on the
emulator, we have used inet version 3 [25]. This tool mod-
els a network based on the way that Autonomous Systems
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Fig. 1
Cumulative distance of relay bandwidths in the Tor
consensus-status document calculated by Tor Scanners in
June 2012.
are connected in the real Internet. We have simulated 50
web servers and 50 relays, where 5 of them are also au-
thority servers, and a number of network infrastructure
nodes such as routers, switches, and so on. For each link
between the nodes, we have considered characteristics like
bandwidth, delay, and loss.
For assigning bandwidths of relays like the real Tor net-
work, we have used the values which are calculated by the
Tor scanners [26] and are recorded in the consensus-status
document. The cumulative distribution of these values in
the June 2012,which consists of 2966 relays, is shown in
Figure 1. Approximately for each relay, the amount shown
in this figure, is the minimum of its upload speed and
download speed. We postulate that 10 percent of relays
are institutional which have the same upload and down-
load speeds and 90 percent of relays are residential which
have download speed equal to twice of their upload speed.
Afterwards we sample systematically from these relays
with the sampling frame size of 60 and select 50 relays,
where values from selected relays (i.e. rate-limiting band-
width for normal and burst traffic, etc.). Furthermore, we
have extracted the measured bandwidth for each sampled
relay as calculated by Tor Scanners. As default path se-
lection algorithm in Tor, selects relays based on that mea-
sured bandwidth and there is no network scanner in our
simulation, we have hard-coded those bandwidth values in
the source of their Tor software’s code.
In this simulation, path selection and assigning streams
to paths has been done through the control port. For this
purpose we have implemented a java program based on
JTorCtl [27] that creates a new path every ten minutes
consisting of three relays.. With this method, we compare
four different path selection methods with each other. For
each path selection methodology the simulation was exe-
cuted for 3 days. Below we will review the different path
selection considered as part of our evaluation:
1. Random: Select 3 non-recurring relays randomly
from the 50 available relays.
2. Default: Employing the default path selection algo-
rithm as used in Tor 0.2.2.35 (last available version
when the simulations were conducted 1), where relays
are selected based on their bandwidth and uptime.
3. Geo: Selecting path only based on minimizing la-
tency to the average geo-graphical location as pre-
sented in Section III.
4. Composite: Using composite metric for path selec-
tion which has been mentioned in section III. This
method benefits from both the advantages of second
and third methods noted above.
We should note that as webservers are chosen randomly
in our simulation, we consider no history in selecting the
avg. geo-location point; so 3rd relay will be selected ran-
domly. This random selection will not affect the results
positively, since avg. geo-location inclines the algorithm
towards selecting circuits which end near to most visited
websites by the user; but when no logic is behind choosing
destination points, then the average geo-location point is
selected randomly, this is equivalent to selecting a random
3rd relay.
Furthermore, as the emulated relays are not geograph-
ically distributed, before running the experiments we
should create a map of Tor relays and specify the delay
between them. So we measure RTT between relays by
using ping packets, when no other traffic exists in the net-
work and then given the observations made in [6] we pos-
tulate these RTT measurements as geographical distance
between relays. We should note that as the experiment
is being done and traffic packets are send over the simu-
lated nodes, the RTT between relays will surely change,
nevertheless we consider them as static given that these
geographical locations will not change. More precisely we
do not transmit any ping packets during the experiment
and that is only done before the start of the evaluation
phase.
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Fig. 2
Time required for downloading 1-byte in different path
selection methods.
1 We have studied the change logs for the current Tor version
2.3.25 and to the best of our knowledge have found no updates to
the path selection mechanism, since the Tor version we have used in
our experiments.
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Time required for downloading 300 KB file in different
path selection methods.
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Fig. 4
Time required for downloading 5 MB file in different path
selection methods.
For measuring the performance of the simulated net-
work, we consider two users. The first user is using Tor
for web browsing and repeatedly downloads small size (i.e.
300 KB) web pages and the other user is using Tor for
downloading large size files (i.e. 5MB) from random web
servers. These behaviors are two different uses of Tor net-
work which are most common between the users. We mea-
sure the time spent for each phase of downloading these
files with a tool named torperf [28].
Figure 2 plots the time spent for receiving the first byte
for each one of the methods. In this figure, least median is
for the Geo method. Take note that as there are only two
active users on the network there are no congested nodes,
therefore when transferring only 1 byte of information the
effect of relay bandwidths is minimal and propagation de-
lay dominates.
You can see the time spent for transferring 300 KB and
5 MB files in Figure 3 and 4. As observed, the default
algorithm employed in Tor, performs better than the Geo
algorithm. This is due to the fact that the Geo algorithm
does not consider the bandwidth of relays when select a
path. When transferring a small size packet (i.e. 1 byte)
Country Percentage number DL Speed UL Speed
(Mbps) (Mbps)
US 15% 270 12.67 3.39
Germany 10% 180 14.67 2.14
Iran 10% 180 1.5 0.91
Italy 10% 180 5.46 1.09
France 5% 90 12.02 2.88
TABLE I
Top-5 Countries using Tor in Jun 2012 and modeling 900
clients based on their share and average bandwidth.
non of the relay’s links will be congested; but when trans-
ferring larger size files, without considering bandwidth of
relays, congestion could occur which results in the addition
of queuing delay to the overall observed delay. Therefore,
it is critical to additionally consider the bandwidth of re-
lays. As observed in Figure 3, combining methods that
try to reduce the propagation delay while selecting higher
bandwidth delays would be advantages.
Nevertheless methods that reduce propagation delay like
Geo, work better for transferring small size files and meth-
ods that reduce queuing delay like default Tor, work better
for transferring big files. So each method has a different
performance with respect to the file size requested, there-
fore and for a better comparison, we should choose file sizes
as the users really request in the real Tor network.
A. Simulating normal behavior of users
Here we model behavior of 900 clients. First we consider
their bandwidths based on the real bandwidths of users
in the real Tor network. According to reports from Tor
metrics [29] half of the users of Tor were from 5 countries
in Jun 2012. We then assign average bandwidth of each
country according to data on NetIndex [30], and partition
900 clients with respect to the percentages of users in those
countries. (See Table I)
For simulating the behavior of clients, we partition them
into two different groups. The first group which consists
of 870 users, use Tor for web browsing. They request an
HTML file and read that page in 5 to 15 seconds and then
request another file and after visiting 150 pages they stop
for a 15-20 minutes break. We simulate this behavior ex-
actly based on [31]. The second group, consisting of 30
users, are bulk downloaders which request large sized files
one after another without interruption. According to [2]
thought they cover only 3% of users but they makeup a
large fraction of network traffic.
For measuring the average requested file sizes by normal
users, we checked top 50 popular websites introduced by
alexa [32]. The cumulative fraction of them on Jun 2012
is available in Figure 5. We selected the 10th, 30th, 50th,
70th, and 90th fractions which are equal to 3, 12, 82, 276,
and 911 Kilobytes and intermittently each user requests
one of them randomly. For bulk users, they request ran-
domly one of the 1, 5, 10, 20, and 50 megabyte files.
Figure 6 shows the impact of using different path selec-
tion methods on the performance. According to this figure,
the bandwidth that user’s experience in composite-metric
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Cumulative distribution of front-page sizes of top 50
popular websites introduced by Alexa in Jun 2012.
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Cumulative distribution of average throughput of 900
clients in different path selection methods.
method is approximately double that of the default Tor
path selection. In the duration of the experiment for each
path selection algorithm, which executed for about 3 days,
approximately 135000 circuits were built. Each of the bulk
downloaders, downloaded about 30 different files on aver-
age and each of the web browsing users requested about
1200 different web pages. For each request, we have calcu-
lated the throughput based on the time spent for the file
transfer. Afterward we have calculated the average perfor-
mance for each user by considering all throughput values
obtained for that user.
Based on the Figure 6, users using random path selec-
tion algorithm obtain the longest download times and they
had the worst throughput. Comparing the Geo-algorithm
with the default path selection algorithm of Tor, some
users have experience better performance with our pro-
posed Geo-algorithm and some obtain a better through-
put with the default Tor algorithm. But Tor algorithm
obtains a better median throughput. Furthermore, the me-
dian throughput that user experience in composite-metric
method is approximately 37KBps which is reasonably bet-
ter than all other considered path selection techniques.
first middle end start-end E(x) d
comb
Random 50 50 50 2450 11.177 0.990
default 19 45 45 625 7.277 0.644
Geo 50 50 50 2450 11.155 0.988
Composite 50 50 50 1947 8.953 0.793
TABLE II
Number of distinct relays selected for different path
selection methods and their entropy and anonymity degree.
It should be noted that in all the experiments, we have
monitored the process and memory usage statistics of
nodes to make sure that no resource issues influences the
results. Also all of the four algorithms consume about the
same resources and none would be considered preferable to
the others in the context of resource usage.
B. Analyzing anonymity
Before using a new algorithm for path selection in Tor,
analyzing its effect on the security of network is of great
importance. One of the more prevalent attacks on Tor is
the Sybil attack [33], in which the attacker takes control
of a fraction of network relays. If the first and the last
selected relays by the user are under control of the at-
tacker then he/she can violate the anonymity by carrying
out a correlation attack. In what follows we will employ
the methodology used in [4] to analyze the security of the
proposed technique.
Based on [34] and as employed in [4], the anonymity
degree is defined as d =
E(X)
Emax
which E(x) is the entropy
and is computed through this relation:
E(X) =−
N∑
i=1
pi log2(pi)
In the above relation N is the number of all different start-
end combinations and pi is the probability of selection of
that combination. So in the best situation, maximum en-
tropy is when every combination has an equal probability
of
1
N
for selection.
For comparing different path selection methods we
should calculate the probability with which the first and
last selected relays are under the control of an attacker.
In the duration of our simulation, each of the 900 clients
creates about 500 circuits. Approximately 150 of the 500
circuits are used and the rest are created as backup cir-
cuits. This is do to the fact that if one of the relays used
in an active circuit is suddenly lost, then the clients should
not restart the circuit creation process all over as it would
delay the communication. Therefore, each client creates
2 or 3 backup circuits, which is not employed unless the
primary circuit fails.
For each path selection method, we have analyzed about
135,000 start-end combinations for calculating anonymity
degree of each path selection method. As we have used 50
relays in our evaluation, the maximum number of different
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start-end combinations will be 50*50=2500. In the best
situation, a path selection method chooses all the start-end
combinations with equal probability where this probability
is 1/2500. So the maximum entropy is:
Hmax =−
2500∑
i=1
(1/2500) log2(1/2500) = 11.28
After analyzing used relays in paths selected by each
method, the number of different start-end combinations
has been measured and is shown in Table II, where the
calculated entropy and anonymity degree for each path se-
lection method is also presented.
As observed, the default path selection has the lowest
anonymity degree and in turn the worst security. In RTT
method relays are selected based on the location of sender
and receiver and because of their diversity, different start-
end combinations have been chosen and anonymity degree
is as high as random path selection. Anonymity degree
of composite-metric path selection algorithm is about 79%
which is better than default Tor path selection. As il-
lustrated earlier, the composite-metric path selection also
has better performance than the default Tor path selec-
tion, therefore we believe that it is a good replacement for
the current path selection algorithms.
V. discussion
In this section we analyze some key design characteristics
of anonymous networks which are of great importance. We
compare our proposed method to some related works in the
context of each characteristic.
Low Computational Cost: There are two approaches
for selecting circuits in an anonymous network. One ap-
proach is selecting nodes one after another and the other
one is selecting a complete circuit at once. The important
point is the processing overhead incurred when selecting
nodes one after another as compared to when selecting a
circuit containing three nodes. Assume that there are n
relays available in the Tor network; if one wants to select
nodes one after another, he should process n nodes three
times for making a circuit i.e. O(n). But if one wants to
select a path containing three nodes, he should process all
possible paths which is about O(n3).
Given the growing number of Tor relays, latency based
methods which analyze all possible circuits require large
processing times. Many latency-based path selection meth-
ods in the literature (i.e. [3], [4], [6]) select a complete
circuit containing three nodes. For decreasing processing
time our proposed algorithm selects nodes one after an-
other instead of selecting the whole circuit, hence it incurs
a much smaller processing overhead.
Unpredictable Path: Using Average-Geo-Location
point brings a lot of advantages. First it makes our al-
gorithm independent of destination IP address. In the
method proposed in [6] which is dependent to destination
IP address, users should make a new circuit for each desti-
nation they want to make a connection with. Where mak-
ing a new circuit for each destination the client wants to
visit, would lengthen the time it takes for the client to re-
ceive the content of interest. In contrast, our algorithm can
make an optimal circuit and use that circuit for many des-
tination IP addresses because the circuit is selected based
on the user behavior and it is an average point of possible
destination addresses used by that specific user.
Moreover, using the average geo-location destination
makes network more invulnerable to attacks. In latency
based methods if an attacker wants to prove a specific
source connection with a destination nearby, he/she can
run many relays between the geographical path along the
source and destination. Then the probability that the user
selects a malicious relay increases. But with average geo-
location the attacker must do more and determine the 3rd
relay position based on the user’s usage history. As its dif-
ficult for an attacker to know the usage history of a user,
and the fact that the position of average-geo-location point
changes over time, it is almost impossible for an attacker
to guess the path and run relays in that path.
Low Traffic Overhead: Our path selection method
uses a locally available IP-geo-location file for measuring
coordinates of relays on a map. So the path selection pro-
cess could be done passively without generating any extra
traffic. Nevertheless [3], [4] should generate a lot of traffic
for selecting a proper path. In the former one, each user
would send many ping packets for calculating distances and
a lot of traffic would be required for transferring coordinate
system information. Also in the latter some traffic would
be generated for violating exit policy, with which feedback
is provided to the sender for estimating the path RTT.
Ease of Implementation: Besides Using our path se-
lection method only needs local modifications on the client
side and it is possible for some users to employ the pro-
posed method in collaboration with other releases of Tor.
In contrast, techniques such as [3] are not practically usable
i.e. all relays should participate in constructing a coordi-
nate system, that would require that all relays, directory
servers, and clients be upgraded.
Minimal Setup Time: As soon as clients start the Tor
browser, they can optimally select circuits in our path se-
lection mechanism but in [4], [5] some time will be required
so that users can calculate latency between an appropriate
number of relays, and in turn select an optimal path.
As there is no practical implementation available for
most of the related works, we could not evaluate the per-
formance and anonymity degree provided by these works
in the same test environment. Nevertheless, we provide
comparison based on the points discussed above in In Ta-
ble III.
There are two important issues which we should address
in the remainder of this section. First and in order to pre-
vent the predecessor attack, Wright et al. [35] proposed
“Entry Guards”. In the current Tor network, three Guard
nodes are randomly selected from relays with high band-
width and high uptime values. In earlier latency-based
path selection methods, Akhoondi et al. [6] propose the
selection of three nearby nodes in three different geograph-
ical directions for resisting such attacks. In our proposed
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composite-metric path selection, we can combine the two
noted approaches and select three nearby relays with high
bandwidth and uptime values, as entry guards, which are
located in three different geographical directions. Hence,
an adversary would be prevented from conducting a pre-
decessor attack on the network.
Second and more importantly, one may argue that if the
user only visits a specific set of websites, then an attacker
could guess the average geo-location point and mount an
attack on the Tor network. Such complications are in-
evitable when employing any logical path selection algo-
rithms, as we are preferring some relays over others. The
most secure path selection method in the Tor network, is
random relay selection; with which there is no preferred
relay among all others. In order to provide better perfor-
mance, different path selection algorithm identify a set of
relays as more preferable to others based on some logic.
For instance, in path selection methods which work
based on bandwidth of relays (i.e. Tors default algorithm),
high-bandwidth relays have a higher chance of being se-
lected by the users. Alternatively, in latency-based path
selection methods (i.e. considering geographical locations),
an adversary who knows a user often connects to a spe-
cific server, can set up controlled relays somewhere in the
path between user and the destination server, although this
would be much harder than just setting up a high band-
width relay.
In the proposed method, an attacker should first obtain
the position of the average geo-location point and then
setup relays in that area to improve his/her chances of
being selected by the client. This would be quite hard, as
the average geo-location point changes over time and is not
fixed, furthermore the attacker would be required to setup
high-bandwidth relays with high up-time values which are
close to a changing average geo-location point.
The only exception is when the client is only using the
Tor network to connect to a single website every time,
then as the average geo-location would be constant, he/she
would limit the random selection of the Tor relays to a
smaller set of possible relays. This is due to the fact that
the proposed relay selection methodology is based on ran-
dom selection from relays ranked based on multiple pa-
rameters (i.e. geographical distance, bandwidth, and up-
time). Therefore, even though the avg. geo-location could
be fixed, the other two parameters still affect the relay se-
lection and we are not limited to a single relay. We do be-
lieve that such usage scenario, where only a single specific
website is visited, is not observed widely. Nevertheless, in
such scenario the attacker would have to run a high band-
width, and high up-time relay near the avg. geo-location.
That is not at all easy, nor straight forward, specially when
compared to the current Tor implementation in which an
attacker just needs to run a high bandwidth and high up-
time server anywhere on the Internet in order to attract
traffic from the users on the Tor network
We believe that given the comprehensive evaluation con-
ducted in this work, and as illustrated by the obtained re-
sults, the proposed technique has better performance and
[3] [4] [5] [6] Our Work
Low Computational Cost 7 7 3 7 3
Unpredictable Path 3 3 3 7 3
Low Traffic Overhead 7 7 3 3 3
Ease of Implementation 7 3 3 3 3
Minimal Setup Time 3 7 7 3 3
TABLE III
Comparison with related works
security in comparison with current Tor default path selec-
tion algorithm; while it has benefits which are not available
in previously proposed techniques.
VI. Conclusion and future works
In this paper, we proposed an algorithm for improving
performance and security of the Tor network, by employing
a combination of different metrics in the process of path
selection between the source and destination nodes. These
metrics are bandwidth and uptime of relays as node con-
ditions and geographical locations of relays as path condi-
tions. Using our novel solution, we could double the perfor-
mance and in addition, our method has greater anonymity
degree than the default path selection algorithm of Tor.
As part of the future works, we are currently pursuing
the deployment of the proposed path selection method-
ology on the PlanetLab [36] platform for a more accu-
rate evaluation, specially when it comes to selecting entry
guards on three different geographical directions as noted
in the previous section. Furthermore, we believe that by
considering more characteristics like congestion, load, and
so on, it is possible to achieve better performance and se-
curity in the future.
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